










Abstract: In this paper, I present a conception of meaning in natural 
language that I call the ‘process model’. According to this conception, 
meaning must be regarded as the result of a process of interaction 
in a community of cognitive-linguistic agents, with one another and 
with the environment. Drawing on this understanding, I argue that 
the study of meaning should no longer focus on logical analysis, but 
rather on an empirical perspective similar to the one in the other 
social sciences. I briefly compare this view with semantic Platonism, 
Imprimátur, VOL. 3 (OCTober 2015): 37–59
a supplementary volume of Ápeiron 
Estudios de Filosofía    (ISSN 2386 – 5326)
38
as well as with Wittgenstein’s and Quine’s approaches to meaning. 
Finally, I outline a way in which this approach could be applied to 
two current problems in the philosophy of language: the treatment 
of linguistic vagueness and the definition of truth. The treatment of 
all these questions is very cursory, as a sort of travel guide for a future 
more detailed research.
Keywords: communication; environment; natural language; Platonic 
idea; social interaction.
0. Introduction
The present paper is divided into three sections – excluding this in-
troductory one. In the first section, I present what I call the ‘process 
model of meaning’. This view states that natural language meaning is 
the result of a process of interaction, amongst members of the cog-
nitive-linguistic community, with one another and with the environ-
ment. I have already provided a first account of this conception in 
(Picazo, 2014), in the context of an analysis of truthmaker theory. 
Here I expand that characterisation in various respects, such as the 
social dimension of meaning, the way in which meaning depends on 
the interaction with the environment, and the way in which meaning 
can be understood as something that emerges from a set of material 
processes.
The second section of this paper is devoted to a brief comparison 
between the process model and other approaches to meaning, which 
uphold or oppose the process model in various ways. In particular, I 
address semantic Platonism – exemplified here by quotations from 
Augustine, Locke, and Frege. Then, I comment on some of the criti-
cisms directed to semantic Platonism by Wittgenstein, Quine, and 
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Michael Dummett. Finally, I highlight some of the differences be-
tween the process model, and Wittgenstein’s and Quine’s views.
In the third and final section of this paper, I point out, by way of 
example, two philosophical problems on which the process model 
may shed some light, and some directions that should be explored 
in that respect. These two problems are: the treatment of linguistic 
vagueness and the definition of truth.
The present paper is hardly conclusive, as an outline of directions 
for future research that can elaborate these points in greater detail. 
Its purpose, then, is to serve as a sort of travel guide for that later 
research.
1. Meanings and processes
1.1. The process model of meaning in natural language is based on a 
very simple idea: meaning is the result of a process of interaction in a 
community of cognitive-linguistic agents, with one another and with 
the environment. This is not a reductive definition, because in order 
to know what a cognitive-linguistic community is, and in order to 
know what type of interaction is relevant for meaning, we previously 
need to be able to identify a language, and hence we previously need 
to be able to identify meaningfulness itself. However, the definition is 
informative inasmuch as it spells out the fundamental elements that 
give rise to meaningfulness – bringing them to our consideration, so 
that we do not overlook any of them.
An immediate consequence of this premise is that linguistic mean-
ingfulness is just a social phenomenon, and it must be approached, as 
such, in a similar way as other social phenomena.
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1.2. It is illuminating, in this respect, to compare the phenomenon 
of linguistic meaningfulness with fashion (a clothing fashion, for ex-
ample). Fashion is an intrinsically social behaviour: it does not make 
sense to say that a person follows a fashion on her own. If only one 
person dresses in a certain way, then that way of dressing does not 
constitute a fashion. Paraphrasing Wittgenstein, it makes no sense to 
speak of a ‘private fashion’.
On the other hand, a fashion does not consist only of many people 
dressing in a certain way. If they do so by obligation, or by chance, 
then that way of dressing does not constitute a fashion. By its own 
nature, a fashion requires an entanglement of social behaviours. A 
fashion requires a certain amount of imitation (‘I like that coloured 
bracelet you are wearing’); a fashion requires a certain initiation cere-
mony (‘buy yourself one, they are very much in vogue’); and a fashion 
requires a certain correction ceremony (‘but not that one, that’s too 
childish’). A fashion requires that a significant proportion of members 
of the community, consciously or unconsciously, accept the social co-
ercion that goes along with fashion, and submit to it. When this does 
not happen – when, for instance, a clothing brand attempts to initiate 
a fashion and does not succeed – we say that such a fashion has not 
caught on, that it has not crystallised.
All these features apply to meaningfulness, as the social phenom-
enon it is. Thus, for instance, for a new word to enter into language, 
it must catch on, it must succeed in that complex sense in which a 
fashion catches on. Indeed, the members of the cognitive-linguistic 
community must accept the new word; they must use it; they must 
introduce it to those who are not acquainted with it; they must cor-
rect each other in the use of it; and they must be prepared to accept 
corrections when they arise.
Moreover, as in the case of fashion, meaning also cannot be dic-
tatorially imposed: it requires the (generally unconscious) will of us-
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ing a word or expression in a particular way. Thus, when a word is 
forbidden, a euphemism usually appears that replaces it; when we 
hear something that we know is being said out of mere obligation, 
we refrain from taking its communicative import at face value; and 
not even the declared intention of using a word in a particular sense 
proves that the word will mean that (there are many books, for in-
stance, that introduce definitions or notational conventions, which 
do not consistently follow afterwards).
Finally, as in the case of fashion, it is impossible that an isolated 
person suffices to provide a word with meaning. This is so because 
meaning in natural language depends on communal behaviour, not 
on what a single person does. Even if a genuinely private language was 
possible – i.e., a language for self-communication, not dependent or 
subsidiary to natural language in any sense – meaning in such a lan-
guage would be of a different character than natural language mean-
ing. That would be so for the simple reason that the mechanism of 
fixation of meaning in natural language is a social one.
On the other hand, between meaning and fashion there are also 
differences worth noticing (besides the obvious ones: linguistic ex-
pressions communicate propositional content in a way that articles 
of clothing do not, etc). Indeed, in following a fashion the individual 
has more conscious control over her clothing choices, and it might be 
easier to trace the motivations for them, compared to the continuous 
and speedy choices between different usage alternatives that fluent 
conversation requires. Moreover, a piece of clothing, for example a 
hat, may continue to exist even though it is no longer in fashion, or 
nobody wears it anymore, while the meaning of the word ‘hat’ will 
disappear if everybody stops talking about hats1.
1 This may sound strange, but it is a straight consequence of the process model of 
meaning. We will come back to this shortly.
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1.3. In any case, the interaction process on which meaning rests is 
not only of a social character: it is also a process of interaction with 
the environment. Thus, for instance, the ground is the place where 
things fall down when there is nothing to hold them – save those 
which are very light, or fly. If things fall down to the ground, it is 
because of gravity, the attraction that Earth exerts on bodies that are 
in its proximity. If gravity disappeared, or we all moved to a place of 
zero gravity, the use of the word ‘ground’ would no doubt be affected.
On the other hand, food is that which suppresses hunger and gives 
us the necessary energy for living. This is how it is, in virtue of our 
biological constitution. If our biological constitution changed, and 
we never again felt hunger or had a need to eat, then the use of the 
word ‘food’ would no doubt be affected.
Neither gravity nor our need to eat are things that we do, but 
things that happen, or things that happen to us. Neither gravity nor 
our need to eat are, properly speaking, ‘uses’. Consequently, although 
it is correct to say that we use the words ‘ground’ and ‘food’ in rela-
tion to these two natural phenomena, it is not completely correct to 
say that the use of these words exhausts their meaning. The meaning 
of these words requires that our use of them takes place in interac-
tion with certain natural phenomena, without which that use – the 
use that these words presently have – would not be possible. It is for 
this reason that, for a complete explanation of meaning, taking into 
account these natural phenomena, and our interaction with them, is 
indispensable.
Moreover, it so happens that such kinds of natural phenomena 
help to fix the meaning, both in human language and in other ani-
mal communication systems, in a crucial way. Thus, for example, the 
location of a food source has a natural relevance for the community, 
and communicating it contributes to building up the community. 
Indeed, not only is there a common interest in eating, but often there 
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is an interest in cooperating with one another in finding food. Hence, 
the feeling of hunger when food is absent, combined with the feeling 
of satiety that eating brings about, crucially help to fix a meaning for 
that area of shared interest that we call ‘food’.
1.4. Furthermore, the interaction with the environment may also 
help to explain the appearance of the first words of a natural language, 
in a particularly plausible way. Thus, for instance, the spontaneous 
uttering of a certain sound at finding food, especially one which an-
ticipates the noise of chewing, might give rise to a ritual of imitation, 
in which a first onomatopoeia (‘yum-yum’) begins to take shape. At 
the beginning, it would not be a meaningful onomatopoeia, but a 
mere game consisting in uttering ‘yum-yum’ in the presence of food. 
Then, after a number of repetitions of the game, the following may 
occur, as if by chance: one day, a member of the community discovers 
a food location, goes back to the group uttering the onomatopoeia, 
and finds out that everybody else surrounds her and accompanies 
her until she shows them where the food is located. Even though this 
pioneer member did not at first have a communicative intention, but 
was only practising the game in non-standard circumstances (in the 
absence of visible food), the social response to her uttering inaugu-
rates a new game: the game consisting in using the onomatopoeia 
‘yum-yum’ as a communication instrument – as a way to alert the 
group that a food source (an opportunity to satiate hunger) has been 
discovered.
For this new use of the onomatopoeia to catch on, two things 
must become habit: firstly, when a member of the community finds a 
food source, she often goes back to the group uttering the onomato-
poeia; secondly, when a member of the community comes back to 
the group uttering the onomatopoeia, the group often follows her 
with the hope of eating (anticipating salivation, for instance). Then, 
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we can say that we are before a genuinely communicative utterance: 
an utterance whose meaning will be delimited by the narrow range 
of socio-environmental actions with which the onomatopoeia is, at 
that moment, intertwined. I think it is not unreasonable to believe 
that the iterated practice of such games, through as many frustrated 
attempts and as many years of evolution as necessary, is at the origin 
of meaning in the first natural languages.
1.5. This view of natural language meaning is in complete opposition 
to the conception according to which meanings are ‘floating ideas’, 
waiting for a mind to grasp them2. In (Picazo, 2014, pp. 715–716) 
I compared the existence of meanings with the existence of rivers. 
A river is a material entity resulting from a set of material process-
es. Indeed, the existence of a river depends on the water cycle in its 
drainage basin, so that if that cycle is cut off, or seriously disturbed, 
the river will cease to exist. Meaning, for its part, is an immaterial 
phenomenon, but its existence is also the result of a set of material 
processes. Indeed, meaning is the result of the interaction amongst 
members of the cognitive-linguistic community, with one another 
and with the environment. For a meaning to exist, the relevant kind 
of social interactions has to take place. Just as a clothing fashion, or 
many other social phenomena, meaning is an immaterial phenom-
enon that emerges from behaviour and from other material processes 
that occur in human societies.
This is why I said before that the meaning of the word ‘hat’ will 
disappear if everyone stops talking about hats. The very talking about 
hats is, under my conception, like a hydrological cycle that feeds the 
2 The use of the phrase ‘floating ideas’ in this context was suggested to me by José 
López Martí. In (Picazo, 2014, p. 726) I wrote: ‘[M]eaning[s] … are not static enti-
ties which float in the air’.
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river comprising the meaning of the word ‘hat’. According to this, if 
everybody stops talking about hats, the delimitation of the concept of 
a hat disappears, it ceases to be fixed inside its particular limits. This is 
so because, under this conception of meaning, what fixes those limits 
is the social use of words corresponding to the concept of hat, i.e., 
the practice and mutual recognition of communicative uses of such 
words3.
On the other hand, the fact that a concept has been lost does 
not mean that it cannot come back to existence. A lost concept can 
indeed come back to life, just as a dried river can come back to life 
if it starts raining again in its drainage basin, and water begins to 
flow through it again on a regular basis. In this sense, it is interest-
ing to note that when a lost concept is reconstructed from historical 
evidence, one of two things can happen: either the members of the 
new linguistic community are not interested in making use of the re-
constructed concept – but only in investigating the old use – or they 
intend to use it again for genuine communication with one another.
In the first case, the only criterion of correctness regarding that 
concept will be the historical proof. This is what happens, for in-
stance, with current investigations of the concept of phlogiston in 
17th and 18th century chemistry: the concept is researched today, 
but nobody intends to incorporate it into today’s chemical physics.
In the second case, the situation is quite different: the active use 
of the concept brings about a fresh correction pattern, as well as the 
possibility of new nuances of the concept turning up. An example of 
this second case could be Heidegger’s reintroduction of the Greek 
3 It is true that those limits, when they exist, are usually vague (i.e., they leave room 
for doubtful cases). However, that does not imply that there is no application cri-
terion for them. Indeed, a doubt about how to apply a criterion can only come up 
when there is a criterion to doubt.
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concept of aletheia, under his own philosophical imprint (cf. e.g. In-
wood, 1999, pp. 13–15). To the extent that a part of the philosophi-
cal community began to use that concept again, and acknowledged 
Heidegger’s use as a pattern to follow, we can say that the concept was 
given a new life, or that it restarted with modifications to its previous 
one4.
2. Meanings without processes
2.1. A conception of meaning that is the polar opposite of the pro-
cess model is what I shall call the ‘conception of meanings as float-
ing ideas’. This conception combines two theses: firstly, meanings are 
identified with ideas or mental contents (i.e., objects that the human 
mind is able to produce or apprehend); secondly, such ideas are taken 
to be self-subsistent (i.e., objects that exist without the need for a 
mind to grasp them).
The thesis according to which meanings are ideas can be found in 
the following quotations from Augustine of Hippo and John Locke:
4 Applying a similar reasoning, it is incorrect to say that thanks to the Rosetta 
Stone we came to know what Egyptian hieroglyphics mean. Egyptian hieroglyphics 
ceased to be meaningful from the moment the linguistic community which used 
them for genuine communication disappeared. What the Rosetta Stone made it 
possible to discover was what hieroglyphics meant at the time they were used by 
the Egyptian community. To the extent that these signs have not been used again 
as genuine communication tools, but only as objects of historical investigation, it is 
not correct to say that they have been brought back to life. In a similar way, a dried 
river does not fill with water by investigating how much water used to flow through 
it in the past; neither an old clothing fashion comes back in vogue by the sheer fact 
of investigating it now. (Alejandro Villa Torrano suggested me to mention Egyptian 
hieroglyphics and the Rosetta Stone at this point.)
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There is no reason for us to signify something (that is, to give a sign) except 
to express and transmit to another’s mind what is in the mind of the per-
son who gives the sign (Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, 396–427 A.D., 
Book II, §3);
The use then of Words, is to be sensible Marks of Ideas; and the Ideas they 
stand for, are their proper and immediate Signification (Locke, An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, 1689, Book III, Ch. 2, §1)5.
 
The thesis according to which meanings are self-subsistent entities 
can be found in the following excerpt from Frege:
[A] sentence expresses a thought (Frege, ‘Thoughts’, 1918, p. 5);
[F]or example the thought we have expressed in the Pythagorean theorem is 
timelessly true, true independently of whether anyone takes it to be true. It 
needs no owner. It is not true only from the time when it is discovered; just 
as a planet, even before anyone saw it, was in interaction with other planets 
(Frege, 1918, pp. 17–18);
How does a thought act? By being grasped and taken to be true … If, for 
example, I grasp the thought we express by the theorem of Pythagoras, the 
consequence may be that I recognize it to be true and, further that I apply it 
in making a decision, which brings about the acceleration of masses (Frege, 
1918, pp. 28–29)6.
5 Italics (and capital letters) were in the original, unless otherwise stated.
6 As a matter of fact, Frege distinguished between the type of mental content which 
is idiosyncratic to an individual mind, and the ‘universal’ mental content, i.e., that 
which is shared by all minds that have grasped it. He called the former ‘idea’ (Vor-
stellung), and reserved the term ‘thought’ (Gedanke) for the latter: ‘[E]very idea has 
only one owner; no two men have the same idea’ (Frege, 1918, p. 15); ‘When [a 
person] grasps or thinks a thought he does not create it but only comes to stand in 
a certain relation to what already existed – a different relation from seeing a thing or 
having an idea’ (Frege, 1918, p. 18, Note 1); ‘Although the thought does not belong 
with the contents of the thinker’s consciousness, there must be something in his 
consciousness that is aimed at the thought. But this should not be confused with the 
thought itself ’ (Frege, 1918, p. 26). This distinction is questionable, inasmuch as we 
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Dummett has described Frege’s position in this respect as mytho-
logical, on the basis of three objections: (i) it does not explain how 
thoughts, being entities of a separate realm of reality, can be about 
entities of the other realms; (ii) it does not explain how thoughts 
are grasped by the human mind; (iii) it does not explain, in the end, 
how thoughts come to be the meanings of our linguistic expressions 
(Dummett, 1986, pp. 251–252). However, despite the criticisms re-
ceived, this semantic Platonism continues to be embraced by many 
contemporary philosophers. A clear example is the following quota-
tion from Rodriguez-Pereyra7:
[F]or the rose to be red it is not required that the proposition that the rose 
is red should be propounded. But that the rose is red requires that there be 
something meaningful that can be said or thought, namely the proposition 
that the rose is red. For if the rose is red, then the proposition that the rose is 
red is true, and therefore the proposition exists. So, necessarily the rose is red 
if and only if the proposition that the rose is red is true. And so, that the rose 
is red requires that the proposition be true no less than that that the proposi-
tion is true requires that the rose be red (Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2009, §4).
2.2. Two of the greatest opponents of the theory of meanings as 
floating ideas have been Wittgenstein,
lack an explanation of how each thought connects with whatever in the individual 
consciousness aims at it (an idea, presumably); but leaving this difficulty aside, it 
seems that the kind of mental content that the theory of meanings as ideas needs 
to invoke cannot be a content which is idiosyncratic to a particular mind, but one 
that is shared by all those minds that, by means of language, communicate it to 
each other.
7 More recent quotations in this spirit are mentioned in (Picazo, 2014, pp. 721–
725).
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The meaning of a word is to be defined by the rules for its use … Two words 
have the same meaning if they have the same rules for their use (Wittgenstein, 
Cambridge Lectures 1932–1935, 1932–1935, I, §2);
[I]f we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to 
say that it was its use (Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, 1933–1935, 
p. 4);
The psychological processes which are found by experience to accompany 
sentences are of no interest to us (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 
1932–1934, I, §6),
and Quine:
Dewey was explicit on the point: ‘Meaning … is not a psychic existence; it 
is primarily a property of behavior’ (Quine, ‘Ontological relativity’, 1968, p. 
185 [in reference to J. Dewey, Experience and Nature, 1925]);
Uncritical semantics is the myth of a museum in which the exhibits are 
meanings and the words are labels … [T]he naturalist’s primary objection 
to this view is not an objection to meanings on account of their being men-
tal entities, though that could be objection enough. The primary objection 
persists even if we take the labeled exhibits not as mental ideas but as Pla-
tonic ideas or even as the denoted concrete objects. Semantics is vitiated by 
a pernicious mentalism as long as we regard a man’s semantics as somehow 
determinate in his mind beyond what might be implicit in his dispositions 
to overt behavior (Quine, 1968, p. 186).
In fact, the process model is mainly inspired by these two authors, 
although there are important differences between their conceptions 
and mine. For example, neither Quine nor Wittgenstein sufficiently 
emphasised the relevance that the interaction with the environment 
has for the theory of meaning. And neither of the two sufficiently 
emphasised the process character of meaningfulness, though it is true 
that the idea of ‘use’ points to a process.
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Moreover, both Wittgenstein and Quine went too far in their dis-
missal of the relevance of psychological processes for the theory of 
meaning. Denying that meanings are identical to mental or psycho-
logical states does not imply that these type of processes are com-
pletely irrelevant for the theory of meaning. The use of wine tast-
ing language, for example, requires a specialisation of the olfactory 
physiology that the ordinary speaker is not presumed to have. And 
the fact that the light-dark scale is inapplicable to the meaning of the 
words ‘infrared’ and ‘ultraviolet’, in contrast with what happens to 
the names of ordinary colours, surely has something to do with the 
fact that we can perceive ordinary colours, but not infrared or ultra-
violet light. Our psychophysiology is part of the interaction process 
from which the phenomenon of meaning emerges, and its relevance 
for that process cannot be ruled out beforehand.
Lastly, although Quine was a convinced naturalist, his theory of 
language does not abound in empirical studies on which to base his 
theses, or in indications of the type of empirical studies that should be 
conducted. However, it is rich in armchair disquisitions and thought 
experiments (such as ‘gavagai’ and the radical translation), directly 
focused on introspection, or on the comparison of one’s introspective 
intuitions with those of other researchers. And as far as Wittgenstein 
is concerned, the methodology that he promoted and followed in 
his semantic investigation was also eminently analytical8. However, 
if natural language is an empirical phenomenon that emerges from 
8 ‘We are not interested in any empirical facts about language’ (Wittgenstein, 1932–
1934, I, §30). ‘[O]ur considerations could not be scientific ones … We must do 
away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this de-
scription gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. 
These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into 
the workings of our language … not by giving new information, but by arranging 
what we have always known’ (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953, I, 
§109).
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empirical processes, how could empirical research not be relevant for 
studying it? It is true that the researcher always possesses a first-hand 
knowledge of her own language, but that is only a practical knowl-
edge (an ability), which by itself does not provide a theoretical expla-
nation of how that language works, and sometimes it makes it even 
more difficult to find one9.
In the end, the inclination toward the methodology of logical-
introspective analysis appears to be nothing else but a remnant of 
semantic Platonism. Indeed, only when I think that language is ‘in 
my head’, I feel there is no need to look further. On the contrary, 
under a genuinely empirical approach, that takes meaning to be just 
another social phenomenon, empirical research appears as the natural 
tool for studying it10.
2.3. In perspective, I see the history of the theory of meaning as a 
succession of stages, through which various layers of complexity have 
been gradually discovered. In a first stage, the meaning of the word 
appeared as a self-subsistent and isolated entity – as a solitary heav-
enly body, moving around in the world of ideas. In a second stage, 
Frege claimed that the meaning of the word should not be analysed 
9 In (Picazo, 2015) I point out four places in Quine’s work in which his linguistic 
competence interferes with his semantic research, driving him to inconsistency.
10 It is true that the story I gave in §1.4 (and to which I will come back in §3.3) is a 
pure invention. However, that story is not used here as a thought experiment from 
which to extract a philosophical thesis. The point of that story, indeed, was just to 
illustrate the type of facts that empirical investigation should help to corroborate 
– if not with respect to the very primal moment of the appearance of language, at 
least with respect to the echoes of that primal moment that could be observable in 
linguistic interactions today.
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independently of the sentence in which it appears11. Some decades 
later, alluding to this step taken by Frege, Quine in turn claimed that 
the unit of analysis should not longer be sentential meaning, but the 
whole of language, together with the corpus of beliefs held by its 
users12. In a fourth step (overlapping chronologically with the third 
one), Wittgenstein urged the placing of meaning in the context of the 
form of life of the linguistic community13. And what I am encourag-
ing now is paying attention to the environment in which the lin-
guistic community lives, to the relevance of the interaction with that 
environment for the fixation of meaning, and to the processual and 
genuinely empirical character of linguistic meaningfulness as a whole.
In this way, the initial conception of meaning as a perfect (ed-
geless) sphere has been gradually leading to a much more complex 
view, in which natural language meaning resembles a puzzle piece, 
full of corners and protrusions. A piece that has to fit into various 
puzzles (the sentence, the language, the knowledge, the community, 
the environment), because only if it fits into them, and only when it 
is regarded as embedded in them, can we attempt to explain its role 
in human cognition and communication.
The most difficult part of this change of mentality is, no doubt, the 
abandonment of semantic Platonism in favour of the social concep-
tion of meaning. Indeed, there is such a tension between these two 
11 It is his celebrated context principle, cf. eg. (Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, 
1884, Introduction, p. xxii, and §60).
12 ‘…the reorientation whereby the primary vehicle of meaning came to be seen 
no longer in the term but in the statement. This reorientation, seen in Bentham 
and Frege…’ (Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, 1951, §5, p. 39). ‘[W]hat I 
am now urging is that even in taking the statement as unit we have drawn our grid 
too finely. The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science’ (Quine, 1951, 
§5, p. 42).
13 ‘[T]o imagine a language means to imagine a form of life’ (Wittgenstein, 1953, 
§19).
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viewpoints, there are such differences between their respective conse-
quences, and it is so difficult to shift from one to the other, that this 
shift amounts to a true change of philosophical paradigm. I believe 
such a change is taking place now, and I see Wittgenstein and Quine 
as the two great pioneers of it. Though not even they, burdened by the 
weight of the Platonic paradigm, were able to bring this change to its 
final conclusion: indeed, they got carried away by their efforts to es-
cape the Platonic paradigm, adopting a too radical anti-psychologism 
as a result; and they failed to see that the logical-introspective meth-
odology was much more in tune with Platonism, than with the social 
conception of language that they were struggling to bring about.
3. Truth and vagueness
3.1. To finish this paper, I would like to point out, by way of illustra-
tion, two problems in the philosophy of language in which the ap-
plication of the process model could help to shed some light. The first 
of them is vagueness.
Let us take a very simple case, the statement (s) ‘It’s damp in here’. 
By ‘s’ I mean the speech act consisting of uttering the sentence ‘It’s 
damp in here’ in ordinary circumstances – so that it will reasonably be 
taken as a declarative speech act, made with the intention of stating 
that the place in which the conversation is occurring has a damp am-
bience. Of course, all this presupposes a number of assumptions that, 
rigorously speaking, should not be made in the absence of a theory 
that accounts for each of them. But let us pretend that we are in pos-
session of such a theory, for the sake of the argument.
The degree of humidity regarding which a competent speaker is 
justified in uttering s is something that cannot be easily anticipated. 
This is precisely the kind of datum that linguistic competence does 
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not enable us to explicate. Indeed, as competent speakers we have 
the ability to correctly use s from our sensorial perception of ambient 
humidity; but that ability is different from the capability of specifying 
a numerical threshold corresponding to it. In order to specify such a 
threshold, we will need a number of things: first of all, we will need a 
measurement scale for humidity; secondly, we will need a measuring 
device; and thirdly, we will need to conduct a number of tests on a 
sufficiently representative sample of speakers. Only then will we be in 
a position to determine the level of humidity above which a speaker is 
justified in uttering s. And it is at that moment when the problem of 
vagueness properly appears.
What does vagueness consist in, addressed in these terms? It con-
sists in the fact that not every speaker, not even the same speaker on 
different occasions, will judge that uttering s is justified in exactly the 
same humidity conditions. The empirical tests will not yield an exact 
number as the threshold for the justified utterance of s, but rather an 
interval. Moreover, different tests, conducted on different occasions, 
will yield slightly different intervals too.
What is it that enables us to communicate with one another, de-
spite such differences? It is the precisely the fact that we speakers al-
ready take these differences into account, in a tacit way. Indeed, we 
are prepared to identify doubtful cases – which will approximately 
coincide with the threshold ranges obtained from the empirical tests. 
And we are prepared to admit different degrees of assertability for 
s – degrees which will in turn be correlated with the humidity scale 
itself. The fact that we speakers, statistically considered, behave in this 
way explains how a statement prototypically vague such as s can have 
a meaning, and how it can be used as a communication tool, despite 
its vagueness.
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3.2. A similar ‘mundane’ perspective might help us to revise the con-
cept of truth. Indeed, the process model could help us to find a way 
to release the concept of truth from the metaphysical burden of ap-
proaches such as the correspondence theory, without falling into the 
trivialisation of the identity or the disquotational approach. It is true 
that we all have, as competent speakers, the ability to determine when 
a statement of our language is true, assuming that we are in posses-
sion of the relevant evidence. But what the process model of meaning 
should help us to do, then, is to identify distinctive features of the 
true assertion which go beyond the ascertainment of that ability.
In this respect, the way in which the verification of the truth of an 
assertion enhances its meaningfulness is quite revealing. Indeed, the 
verification of an assertion boosts the social process from which its 
communicative character emerges, and helps us to come full circle, 
so to speak. While, on the other hand, the discovery that an assertion 
is false (whether it is a deliberate falsehood, or the speaker was being 
honest but made a mistake) has an eroding effect on the communica-
tion flow. Indeed, the discovery of a falsehood invites a readjustment 
(a rectification, or an amendment) with respect to that assertion – a 
readjustment without which linguistic communication will be dam-
aged.
As I have mentioned in (Picazo, 2014, p. 715), if all statements 
a speaker uttered were false, and we found no way of reinterpreting 
her words so as to give a reasonable meaning to them, communica-
tion with that person would become impossible. In such a case, we 
would not continue to accept her statements indefinitely. We would 
not continue to repeatedly get puzzled at her statements, one after an-
other. Rather, we would at some point stop taking seriously what that 
person was saying, calling into question the communicative value of 
everything that came out of her mouth.
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3.3. Moreover, the transmission of a falsehood (whether it is an inten-
tional falsehood or a simple mistake) is always conducted on the basis 
of a previous communication convention. This is in contrast to the 
social ceremony that gives rise to meaningfulness, a ceremony that 
cannot be anything else but the transmission of truthful information. 
Indeed, let us go back to the idealised scenario described in §1.4. The 
moment in which the primitive tribe discovers the communicative 
utility of the onomatopoeia is precisely when she, who has uttered the 
onomatopoeia in absence of visible food, leads the group to the food 
source. The sight of the food and the satiation of hunger by eating it, 
crucially reinforce the game of uttering the onomatopoeia in order to 
alert the group that food has been found. The veracity of the alert, 
then, leads to a positive reinforcement that encourages the repetition 
of the game, strengthens its limits, and makes the communicative 
character of the game transparent to everyone.
However, let us suppose that once this game or social convention 
is already in force, a case takes place in which a member of the group 
utters the onomatopoeia, but is unable to bring the group to the food 
source. This will no doubt have an eroding effect on the practice of 
the game. Indeed, such a case will diminish, on a first level, the par-
ticular credibility of that group member, eroding the meaningfulness 
of the onomatopoeia on her lips. On a second level, and to a lesser de-
gree, such a case will erode the meaningfulness of the onomatopoeia 
on anybody’s lips. And on a third level, and to a minimum degree, 
the discovery of that rudimentary falsehood may have a discouraging 
effect on any other communicative utterance.
Of course, characterising truth as something which, upon being 
corroborated, boosts meaningfulness, and characterising falsehood as 
something which, upon being corroborated, erodes it, is not a con-
clusive analysis, because there are many other factors involved in the 
global process of linguistic communication, that contribute to boost 
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or to erode meaningfulness in various ways. However, I think that it 
may be a step in the right direction of taking the notion of truth out 
of the field of logical analysis, and bringing it closer to the field of 
empirical research, along with the rest of social sciences.
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